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Abstract 
Previous research indicates that Black Americans are more likely than White 
Americans to think that racism still plays a role in current events. Mainstream 
accounts often explain these differences as the product of something about Black 
Americans that leads them to over-perceive racism. This paper applies a cultural 
psychology analysis to this phenomenon and suggests a more neutral account of the 
differences. This study examined whether engagement with history knowledge and 
various identity constructions (national and racial identity) were related to racism 
perceptions among White (n = 85) and Black (n = 65) undergraduates. As 
hypothesized, the present research replicated group differences in perception and 
found a positive relationship between historical knowledge and perceptions of racism 
in Hurricane Katrina-related events. The present research suggests that there are 
representations of American history that reconcile these racial differences in 
perception and allows all Americans, regardless of their identity, to find common 
ground. 
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Perception of racism in ambiguous events: A cultural psychology analysis 
White folks have been quick to accuse Blacks…of playing the race card, as if their 
conclusions have been reached not because of careful consideration of the facts as 
they see them, but rather, because of some irrational (even borderline paranoid) 
tendency to see racism everywhere. 
–Tim Wise, (2008) What kind of card is race? 
Historically, psychologists have linked perceptions of racism with irrational 
fear and considered them indicators of pathology (Whaley, 2002; Guthrie, 1976). In 
fact, clinicians are still likely to misdiagnose Black Americans who express a general 
mistrust of White society (i.e., cultural paranoia and cultural mistrust) as 
schizophrenic or otherwise disturbed (Whaley, 2002; 2006). Although research 
suggests that cultural mistrust is a normative and adaptive response to a system of 
racism and oppression (Whaley 2001), these constructions of racism claims as 
paranoia imply that Black communities are somewhat out of touch with reality in 
ways that White communities are not.  
In contrast to mainstream accounts, this paper applies a cultural psychology 
analysis to the topic of group differences in perception of racism (Adams & Salter, 
2007). Applied to this phenomenon, a cultural psychology analysis makes two 
important contributions. First, by adopting the perspective of the oppressed, a cultural 
psychology analysis reveals a less pathologizing account of racism perceptions. In 
contrast to the prevailing belief that perceptions of racism are grounded in paranoia or 
unfounded concern, a cultural psychology perspective suggests that it is precisely 
“careful consideration of the facts”—accurate knowledge of the historical past—that 
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influences divergent perceptions of racism in ambiguous events. Second, by turning 
the analytical lens, a cultural psychology analysis reveals how apparently neutral 
constructions of reality, too, are culturally grounded. In contrast to prevailing beliefs 
that perceptions of racism are solely linked to Black identity concerns, a cultural 
psychology analysis suggests that perceptions of racism (and denial) are tied to 
identity-relevant concerns among White Americans, as well. 
Group Differences in Perception of Racism 
Previous research indicates that Black Americans are more likely than White 
Americans to think that racism still plays a role in American society (Feagin, 2006). 
Following the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the U.S. media reported similar racial 
differences in perceptions of racism in the aftermath of the storm. While the majority 
of Black respondents (71% ) agreed that the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina 
demonstrated that racial inequality was still a problem in the U.S.,  only 32% of 
White respondents agreed with this statement (Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press, 2005). How is one to explain this difference? 
"Playing the Race Card"  
Media and scientific reports often explain group differences in perception of 
racism as the product of something about Black Americans that leads them to 
perceive racism in events. For example, a widely cited study examined racial group 
differences in beliefs about government conspiracies perpetrated against Black 
Americans (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadax, & Blaine, 1999). The investigators explain 
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Black Americans’ beliefs in conspiracy theories as the product of "system blame": 
attributing problems facing the Black community to prejudice and discrimination.  
For Black Americans, these conspiracy theories may represent an attempt to 
cope with a predicament posed by stigma—the fact that Black Americans are 
faring poorly, as a group, relative to White Americans. Attributing problems 
facing Black Americans to something about Blacks themselves threatens the 
personal and/or collective self-esteem of Blacks. Attributing those problems to 
prejudice and discrimination deflects these potentially self threatening 
implications. (Crocker et al., 1999, p. 943)  
The researchers suggest that system blame beliefs can have self-protective 
consequences for Black Americans. Highlighting the same idea, work on attributional 
ambiguity also suggests that members of stigmatized groups are motivated to attribute 
negative outcomes to prejudice against their group in order to protect self-esteem 
(Crocker & Major, 1989). They found that Blacks were more likely to attribute 
negative feedback from a White evaluator to prejudice than were Whites (Crocker, 
Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). If the Black participants believed the fictional White 
evaluator could see them, they were more likely to attribute the feedback, whether 
positive or negative, to prejudice more than if they believed their evaluator could not 
see them. The researchers suggest that members of stigmatized groups will attribute 
negative feedback to prejudice whenever it is plausible, and that these attributions 
have protective consequences for self esteem. 
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Regardless of researcher intentions (see Crocker & Major, 2003), this sort of 
explanation—the idea that Black Americans endorse various conspiracy theories, 
inflate attributions to prejudice, and deflect personal blame in order to protect their 
self-esteem—is akin to the suggestion that Blacks are “playing the race card”. 
Implicit in “playing the race card” framings is the idea that attributions to racism and 
discrimination represent motivated exaggerations, delusions, and deviations from 
accurate perceptions of reality.  
Responses to this idea have generally challenged the extent to which 
attributions to racism and discrimination necessarily have positive consequences. 
Specifically, researchers have questioned the extent to which constant attributions to 
racism protect self-esteem. Branscombe and colleagues found that stable attributions 
to prejudice did not have positive consequences for well-being; instead, attributions 
were negatively related to both personal and collective self-esteem (Branscombe, 
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). The rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 
1999) suggests that it is increased minority group identification that protects self-
esteem, not attributions to pervasive discrimination, per se. By noting that attributions 
to discrimination can have negative consequences, Branscombe and colleagues 
challenge the idea that people might be motivated to perceive racism for self-esteem 
purposes.  
“Perceptual Baggage” 
Another way in which mainstream social psychology pathologizes racism 
perception comes from investigations that have focused on explaining individual 
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differences among members of stigmatized groups (e.g., Pinel, 1999; Operario & 
Fiske, 2001; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002; Johnson, 
Simmons, Trawalter, Ferguson, & Reed, 2003). First, these studies locate the 
phenomenon of group differences in perceptions of racism in something about Black 
Americans. Specifically, research suggests that perceptions of racism might be 
grounded in expectations of negative treatment among members of stigmatized 
groups (i.e., belief in White anti-Black bias, stigma consciousness, and rejection 
sensitivity). Second, these studies primarily focus on the negative implications of 
racism perception. 
In one study, Johnson and colleagues (2003) examined perceptions of 
ambiguously racist behavior among Black and White college students. They found 
that Blacks were more likely than were Whites to attribute racist dispositions to 
persons acting in an ambiguously racist fashion, but only when they were provided 
cues that the person’s behavior did not reflect their actual feelings. Johnson and 
colleagues suggest that the racial group difference in perceptions of racism might be 
the result of Black Americans’ prior beliefs that White people harbor anti-Black 
biases. They found support for this assertion and suggested that Blacks may have 
ignored, distorted, or reinterpreted the subtle non-racist cues in ways that 
corresponded with their previous beliefs about Whites’ racist attitudes towards 
Blacks. They concluded that this type of “perceptual baggage” (Johnson et al., 2003, 
p. 621) might have a profound impact on subsequent interpretations of ambiguous 
behavior.   
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Another research example suggests that members of stereotyped groups who 
are high in stigma consciousness—that is, the extent to which people focus on their 
stigmatized status (Pinel & Paulin, 2005)—are more likely to perceive discrimination 
to be directed at their group and their personal selves. Because of this, persons high in 
stigma consciousness may forgo opportunities to disconfirm the stereotypes about 
their group (Pinel, 1999; Study 6) and are perhaps more susceptible to stereotype 
threat (Brown & Pinel, 2003). This line of work suggests that ruminating on one’s 
stereotyped status is problematic. Although stigma consciousness is positively 
associated with group consciousness—thus making persons high in stigma 
consciousness more apt to fight discrimination—it also may come at a price. 
Similar conclusions emerge from research on racial rejection sensitivity: the 
extent to which people “anxiously expect, readily perceive, and intensely react to 
rejection” based on social group membership (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002, p. 897). 
Researchers investigated the relationship between racial rejection sensitivity and 
reported college experiences among Black Americans. Mendoza-Denton and 
colleagues found that first-year Black American college students who were highly 
sensitive to race-based rejection reported more negative race-based experiences (e.g., 
experiencing racial profiling on campus), incurred more negative consequences (e.g., 
lowered well-being and decreased academic performance), and reported less 
university belongingness over the course of the study. Work on racial rejection 
sensitivity suggests that students expecting race-based rejection on campus are also 
well-equipped to perceive and experience such negative treatment.  
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A cultural perspective 
Rather than concentrating on the motivation or affective consequences 
associated with racism perception, the present paper takes a somewhat different 
approach to the topic. The first step of a cultural psychology analysis is to articulate a 
less pathologizing account of racism perceptions. One might do this by considering the 
phenomenon from the perspective of the oppressed (see Martín-Baró, 1994), 
incorporating community expertise, values, and insights. From this perspective, one 
can (and should) critically assess the dominant views. The second step of a cultural 
psychology analysis is to turn the analytic lens from explanations of the “other” and 
shine light on the typically unquestioned, dominant perspective. The purpose of this 
second step is to illuminate the psychology of the dominant perspective as interesting 
phenomena as well. Together, these steps aim to present a more adequate and 
culturally-sensitive analysis of racial group differences in perceptions of racism.  
Step 1: A less pathologizing account of Black American perceptions of racism 
In contrast to the motivational or perceptual-bias type explanations of racism 
perception, a cultural psychology perspective suggests that racial differences in 
perceptions of racism are also linked to a more neutral source: cultural engagement. 
One aspect of cultural engagement with a community is identification (Adams, 
Fryberg, Garcia, & Delgado-Torres, 2006). Research indicates that a positive 
relationship among minority group members between community engagement (as 
measured by racial/ethnic identification) and perceptions of racism (Adams et al., 
2006; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Sellers & Shelton, 2003), perhaps 
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especially in subtle rather than overt manifestations (Operario & Fiske, 2001, Shelton 
and Sellers, 2000, Study 2). Another aspect of community engagement might be the 
extent to which one utilizes the ideologies and cultural constructions within that 
community.  
An important set of ideologies and cultural constructions are representations 
of history (i.e., collective understandings of the past; Howarth, 2006). Particularly, 
representations of history shape group-based identities and perceptions of intergroup 
conflict (Liu & Hilton, 2005). With this in mind, differences in historical knowledge 
are another potential source of differences in perception of racism (Essed, 1991). 
Previously reviewed studies examining individual differences in perceptions of 
racism among Black Americans seemingly share a common thread: expectation of 
bias.  However, one might ask from where do these negative expectations stem? On 
one hand, they might stem from previous personal encounters with racism (Sellers & 
Shelton, 2003); but, are experiences with racism and discrimination neccesary to 
construct another experience as due to racism? On the other hand, perceptions of 
racism might stem from knowledge of racism obtained through other means (i.e., 
information containing narratives about racismor racial socialization; Essed, 1991). 
Moreover, familiarity with differing representations of the historical past, which may 
or may not incorporate narratives of discrimination or racism, might be enough to 
shape perceptions of racism in the present (Nelson, Branscombe, Adams, & Schmitt, 
2007).  
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Evidence for this possibility comes from research that examined the role of 
historical knowledge in beliefs about conspiracies perpertrated against Black 
Americans by the U.S. government (Nelson et al., 2007; Study 1). They found that 
not only did the Black American participants in their study have greater knowledge of 
historically documented conspiracies, but also this knowledge of historically-
documented conspiracies mediated the racial group difference in plausibility of new 
conspiracies (Nelson et al., 2007; Study 1).  In a follow-up experiment, they also 
found that exposure to instances of historically-documented anti-Black government 
harm-doing increased the plausibility of contemporary anti-Black conspiracies among 
White American participants (Nelson et al., 2007; Study 2).  This suggests that for 
both Black and White Americans, engagement and familiarity with anti-Black 
conspiracies in the past shape perceptions of anti-Black conspiracies in the present.  
One limitation of Nelson and colleagues (2007) is that it could not rule out 
whether reported familiarity with past racism represented motivated exaggeration. 
Perhaps, ratings of familiarity with historical conspiracy theories actually reflect “the 
tendency to perceive allegations of racism in past events as true, regardless of their 
actual truth status” (Nelson et al., 2007; p. 25). In other words, it may be that Black 
Americans responses to items regarding familiarity with historical racism reflect, not 
historical knowledge, but instead another case of willingness to “play the race card”.  
Step 2: Turning the analytic lens toward White American perceptions of racism 
Implicit in many of the investigations on racism perception is an interest in 
explaining when and why Black Americans attribute ambiguous situations to 
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prejudice or racism. A cultural psychology analysis suggests that focusing solely on 
the behaviors of Black Americans constructs the experience of Black Americans as 
somehow deviant, strange, and the only perspective warranting explanation (see also 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, on the topic of social category norms). Certainly, one would 
hope that racism was an uncommon occurrence, but history suggests that racism is 
embedded in the very fabric of American society. The reality is that Black Americans 
and other minority groups are not the only persons living in a context in which racism 
pervades. At very least, denials of this reality warrant exploration. Recent work 
provides support for the idea that American and White identities, too, are linked to 
perceptions of racism (i.e., denial).  
Just as Black Americans may be motivated to perceive racism to protect self-
esteem, might White Americans be motivated to deny racism? Research by Adams, 
Tormala, and O’Brien (2006) suggests that this is the case. In two separate 
experiments. White American participants who received a self-affirmation 
manipulation (i.e., in the face of a personal threat, self-affirmation reduces self-
protective motives) perceived higher rates of racism than those who did not. This and 
other research suggests that White Americans are motivated to deny the impact of 
racism in American society to the extent that it threatens the legitimacy of a status 
quo from which they derive benefits (e.g., meritocracy beliefs; O'Brien & Major, 
2005) and constitutes a threat to a positive racial identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & 
Schiffhauer, 2007).  
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Mainstream representations of history and racism are likely to be another 
important source of information regarding perceptions of racism. Just as Black 
American perception of racism may have its roots in greater knowledge of historical 
racism; might White American denial of racism have its roots in greater ignorance of 
historical racism? Although narratives about racism are not wholly absent, 
mainstream American accounts of the historical past frequently construct racism as 
the product of “a few bad apples” (Loewen, 1995). While scholars have introduced 
nuanced definitintions of racism that include systems of privilege and disadvantage 
embedded in American society and culture; research suggests that the White 
American lay person conceptualizes racism simply as hostile, individual prejudice 
(Bobo, 2001; Esses & Hodson, 2001; Sommers & Norton, 2006).  
What are the consequences of individualistic constructions of racism? In a 
longitudinal study, O’Brien and her colleagues (2008) found that the more 
participants endorsed an individualistic conception of racism at Time 1, the less 
racism they perceived in Katrina-related events at Time 2. An individualistic 
definition of racism that requires an agent vastly limits what possibly constitutes 
racism and the likelihood that systemic instances of racism are labeled as such. If 
racism is included in community narratives, research suggests that what constitutes 
racism, in the first place, informs perceptions of racism in America’s past and present 
(Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008; Adams, Edkins, 
Lacka, Pickett, & Cheryan, in press; O’Brien et al., 2008).  
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The Present Study 
From a cultural psychology perspective, this study investigates how 
knowledge of historical racism and various identity constructions inform divergent 
perceptions of racism in the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. To examine this 
question, I compared perceptions of racism among White participants attending a 
predominantly White institution (PWI) and Black participants attending a historically 
Black institution (HBI). These are groups for whom collective representations 
associated with identity and knowledge of historical racism are likely to differ 
substantially. 
One set of hypotheses concern between-racial group differences in the 
tendency to perceive racism in Katrina-related events. Previous research has 
documented group differences in perception of racism, such that Black Americans are 
more likely than White Americans to perceive racism in many events (e.g., Klugel, 
1990). Applied to the case of Hurricane Katrina, one can hypothesize a similar 
pattern. 
H1:The White American participants (a) will perceive less racism in Katrina-
relevant events; (b) will express greater endorsement of statements that deny a 
role for racism in Katrina, (c) will score lower on a measure of accurate 
knowledge about historical instances of racism, and (d) will endorse systemic 
conceptions of racism less than do the Black American participants.  
The next set of hypotheses is an extension of the first set and concerns within-
community variation in tendency to perceive racism as a function of identification 
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with different social entities (e.g., Operario & Fiske, 2001). Given an understanding 
of identification as cultural engagement with identity group (e. g., Phinney & Ong, 
2007), one can hypothesize that racial differences in outcome variables will be greater 
among highly identified (or more engaged) participants than less identified (or less 
engaged) participants. Further support for this hypothesis comes from previous 
research that found one aspect of racial identity (i.e., private regard) was positively 
related to beliefs in conspiracies perpetrated against Blacks by the U.S. government 
among Black Americans, but negatively related to belief in conspiracies among White 
Americans (Crocker et al., 1999). If belief in anti-black conspiracies includes belief 
that the government might perpetuate racism, then one can hypothesize a similar 
pattern in this study.  
H2a: Racial identification will moderate racial group differences in perception of 
racism, such that racial/ethnic private regard should be negatively related to 
perceptions of racism among the White American participants; but, positively 
related to perceptions of racism among the Black American participants.  
Recent work suggests that identity is not a unidimensional endorsement of 
group importance, but is multidimensional (e.g., Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & 
Chavous, 1998; Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & 
Liviatan, 2006). Because different dimensions of the same identity category can have 
diverging relationships with the same outcome variable (e.g., Roccas et al., 2006), I 
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also included identity measures from another identity dimension (i.e., centrality1; 
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to explore the relationships of racial and national 
identification with perceptions of racism. While private regard refers to one’s 
personal positive evaluation of that social group identity, centrality refers to the 
overall importance of one’s social group to one’s self-concept, (Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992). 
Researchers note that it is important to examine multiple dimensions of 
identity because these concepts are independent of one another (e.g., Ashmore et al., 
2004). For example, Roccas and colleagues (2006) found contradictory relationships 
between two identity dimensions (i.e., glorification and attachment) and responses to 
information about an in-group’s transgressions against an out-group’s members. 
Glorification is an identity dimension that primarily considers the positive aspects of 
one’s group identity, much like private regard. In the study by Roccas and colleagues, 
glorification was positively related to justifying these actions and low levels of 
collective guilt. When controlling for glorification, attachment (inclusion of the group 
into one’s self concept) was negatively related to justifying the negative actions. The 
centrality measure used in this study parallels their measure of attachment; thus, to 
the extent that denial of racism among White Americans mirrors justification for 
one’s groups negative past, I expect a similar pattern of results with centrality among 
the White American participants. A positive relationship between racism perception 
                                                 
1 In the original Collective Self-Esteem scale, this measure is referred to as identity. However, in order 
to avoid confusion, I refer to this subscale as centrality (as described in Sellers et al., 1998) since I am 
considering multiple dimensions of “identity” in this study.  
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and racial centrality is anticipated among the Black American participants, as well. 
Since racism perception does not implicate Black identity in the same way that it 
might White identity (evoke justifications), the present research does not hypothesize 
differing relationships on this dimension among the Black American participants. 
H2b: When controlling for racial/ethnic private regard, identity centrality should 
be positively related to perceptions of racism among the Black and White 
American participants.  
Beyond measures of ethnic/racial identity and their relationship to perception 
of racism, a cultural approach to identification (as cultural engagement) extends 
existing research in two important ways. The first is to consider engagement with 
multiple dimensions of identity that are relevant to perceptions of racism. Although 
previous research has emphasized racial or ethnic identification as a relevant indicator 
of community engagement, people understand themselves in terms of a variety of 
identity communities, beyond ethnic-racial membership, that influence their 
experience of everyday events. An important source of collective identification that is 
likely to influence perception of racism is national identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). To the extent that a group’s negative actions might threaten a group’s positive 
identity (Doojse, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998), research suggests that 
group identity should be negatively related to perceptions of actions that negatively 
implicate that group. Subsequently, one can anticipate that American identity would 
be negatively related to perceptions of racism among the White American 
participants. However, among the Black American participants, engagement with 
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both their American-ness and their Black-ness may present somewhat of a paradox 
(i.e., “double consciousness”; Du Bois, 1903/1989, p. 5; Lyubansky & Eidelson, 2005). 
As an indicator of engagement with this American-ness, a cultural perspective 
suggests that American identification (private regard) should to be negatively related 
to perceptions of racism among the Black American participants, as well. This 
perspective is consistent with previous research documenting positive relationships 
between nationalism scores and endorsement of classical racism items (i.e., prejudice 
against minority groups) for both White and Black Americans (Sidanius, Feshbach, 
Levin, & Pratto, 1997).  
H3a: A commonly shared identity, national identification (private regard) will be 
negatively related to perceptions of racism for White and Black American 
participants. This relationship will be particularly true among White participants. 
Again, to the extent that denial of racism mirrors justification for America’s 
wrong doings, then one can anticipate that when controlling for private regard, 
national identity centrality should be positively related to perceptions of racism.  
H3b: When controlling for national private regard, identity centrality should be 
positively related to perceptions of racism among White and Black American 
participants.  
More generally, research on ethnic minority-majority asymmetry (e.g., 
Staerkle, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2005) and the "American equals White" effect 
(Devos & Banaji, 2005) suggest greater resonance between national identity and 
racial identity for ethnic majority groups than for ethnic minority groups. The present 
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hypothesis of similar patterns of results for national identity and racial identity among 
White Americans, but dissimilar or even diverging patterns of results for national 
identity and racial identity among Black Americans, extends this idea of "greater 
resonance" to the relationship between identification and perception of racism. 
The second way in which a cultural psychology approach extends existing 
research beyond a concern with ethnic identification is to consider an alternative 
measure of community engagement—knowledge of Black American cultural 
representations of the historical past—and its role in informing perceptions in the 
present. A cultural psychology perspective suggests that racism perception is not 
restricted to personal experience, but might be influenced by engagement with 
various cultural narratives about racism. As such, one can anticipate positive 
relationships between historical knowledge and perception of racism measures. 
Similar to Nelson and colleagues (2007), I suggest that accurate knowledge of 
historical racism might explain the hypothesized racial group differences. A 
meditational hypothesis proposes that the strength of the racial group differences in 
perceptions of racism will decrease when history knowledge is taken into account. 
H4: Accurate knowledge of historical racism and African American achievements 
will be positively related to perceptions of racism in Hurricane Katrina. 
Moreover, Black history knowledge will mediate the racial differences in 
perceptions of racism.  
Although conceptually similar to Nelson and colleagues (2007) the present 
study extends this work in some important ways. First, this study incorporates a 
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signal detection paradigm that can assess whether knowledge of historical racism 
reflects a tendency to see racism everywhere; or, instead, reflects accurate awareness 
of historically documented instances of racism in the past (e.g., Adams & Nelson, 
2008). Nelson and colleagues did not directly test whether Black Americans 
indiscriminately see racism in any situation (past or present). Second, the present 
study extends work by Nelson and colleagues by incorporating multiple dimensions 
of racial and national identity. This aspect differs from the follow-up study by Adams 
and Nelson (2008), as well. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 211 undergraduates ranging in age from 17 to 34 years old 
(M = 18.96 years, SD = 1.75), including 96 students at Howard University, a HBI in 
Washington, D. C., and 115 students at the University of Kansas, a PWI in Lawrence, 
KS. One hundred eighty-two participants indicated American nationality. Sixty-two 
percent of the participants were women (n =131) and 38% were men (n = 80). The 
modal response for socioeconomic status was “middle class.”  
Among the Howard participants in this sample, 77 indicated that their 
race/ethnicity was African American or Black; 9 indicated African, West Indian, 
Jamaican, or Caribbean; 5 participants indicated multiple racial/ethnic identities or 
said that they were bi-racial or mixed; 1 participant indicated Hispanic; and 1 
participant indicated Native American. Other responses included American (n= 2), 
ethnic (n = 2), human (n = 1), minority (n = 1), and n/a (n = 1). Among  Kansas 
 19 
participants, 89 indicated that their race/ethnicity was Caucasian or White; 18 
indicated Asian, Asian American, or Chinese; 4 indicated Hispanic or Mexican, 3 
participants indicated Black; 2 indicated Native American; 2 indicated multiple 
racial/ethnic identities; 1 participant indicated Jewish; 1 participant indicated Italian; 
1 participant indicated African; and 1 participant indicated Southwest Pacific. Other 
responses included American (n = 2), ethnic (n = 1), and other (n =1). 
Procedure 
 I recruited participants from introductory psychology participant pools at both 
research settings. A White woman distributed surveys at the University of Kansas and 
a Black woman distributed surveys at Howard University. After reading the informed 
consent form and agreeing to participate in the study, participants completed the 
survey in one of two pre-arranged orders. The first version began with identification 
questions as in the appendix. The second order began with the open-ended historical 
knowledge measure, but otherwise followed the same order as in the appendix.  
Materials   
Each participant completed a questionnaire containing measures of national 
and racial identification (adapted from Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), historical 
knowledge (adapted from Adams & Nelson, 2008), conceptions of racism (adapted 
from Adams et al., in press) and perceptions of racism in Hurricane Katrina (see 
Appendix). Demographic questions included age, gender, and socioeconomic status.  
Racial/Ethnic Identification. To assess self-identification tendencies, I adapted 
the open-ended response question, “In terms of racial/ethnic group, I prefer to identify 
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with the label [blank]” from the Multigroup Ethnic Identification Measure (Phinney, 
1992). To assess level of identification for participant race and/or ethnicity, I used 
two subscales of the Collective Self Esteem measure (CSE; Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992). The CSE private regard (e.g., In general, I’m glad to be a member of my 
racial/ethnic group; Cronbach’s α = .69) and identity centrality (e.g., The 
racial/ethnic group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am; α = 78) 
subscales measure individual differences in the positive assessment and importance of 
one’s social or collective identity. Participants responded to these questions with a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
National Identification. Participants indicated their nationality by checking 
either American, Canadian, or other. Again, I adapted private regard (α =.79) and 
identity centrality subscales (α =.70) of the CSE to measure the level of national 
identification for each participant (e.g., I feel good about the nation I belong to; The 
nation I belong to is an important reflection of who I am). Participants responded to 
these questions with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much).  
Claims of Racism Denial. Five items assessed denial of racism in Hurricane 
Katrina (α =.83). Participants used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate their agreement with claims that dismissed 
accounts of racism in Hurricane Katrina (e.g., Claims of racism in events surrounding 
Hurricane Katrina were wildly exaggerated). 
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Perceptions of Racism. Seventeen items assessed perceptions of racism in the 
events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Participants used a 7 point Likert scale (1 = 
not at all due to racism; 7 = certainly due to racism) to indicate the extent to which 
each of the 17 instances were due to racism. A principal components analysis using 
varimax rotation yielded two reliable factors. The first factor (α =.94) consisted of 12 
items that one can interpret as systemic manifestations of racism (e.g., The U.S. 
Government’s slow response in aiding New Orleans residents during the Katrina 
disaster). The second factor (α =.84) had 5 items that one can interpret as isolated, 
individual manifestations of possible instances of racism (e.g., A White man in a pick- 
up truck fleeing New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina decides not to pick up some 
Black people walking alongside the highway). Table 1 shows the factor loadings for 
both Black and White participants. 
Conceptions of Racism. Participants placed an "x" along a 16.5 cm line in 
order to respond to the question, "Where do you think racism in modern America 
comes from?" Participant responses were recorded as the number in centimeters 
where their “x” crossed the 16.5 cm line. This measure treated conceptions of racism 
as a bipolar scale item with an individualistic conception of racism (i.e., biased 
individuals) at zero endpoint and a systemic conception of racism (i.e., socio-cultural 
structures) at the other 16.5 cm endpoint (Adams et al., in press; see also O’Brien et 




Factor loadings for perception of racism factors 
        
 Factor 1 (Systemic)  Factor 2 (Individualistic) 
Item Black White Combined  Black White Combined 
1. .413 .809 .703  .357 .152 .462 
2. .393 .325 .208  -.224 .603 .579 
3. .461 .798 .716  .334  .261 
4. .564 .848 .827  .318   
5. .654 .178 .340  .169 .769 .756 
6. .764 .618 .710  .159 .196 .351 
7. .706 .605 .691  .152 .383 .395 
8. .643 .776 .732   .198 .296 
9. .325 .457 .439  .129 .418 .125 
10. .696 .587 .645  .240 .522 .500 
11. .521 .751 .759  .517 .381 .404 
12. .223   .211  .396 .846 .832 
13. .425 .782 .771  .631 .121 .272 
14.  .805 .685  .777 .285 .493 
15. -229  .156  .775 .836 .818 
16. .526 .498 .538  .374 .484 .601 
17. .407 .684 .685  .650 .484 .555 
Note. Bold numbers indicate the scale on which the item was included. Empty cells 
represent items that did not load onto the factor. 
  
Historical Knowledge. To measure knowledge of Black history, participants 
completed a ‘true-false’ test, consisting of 25 items. History items included instances 
of historical racism (e.g., After slavery ended, Jim Crow laws—which enforced 
segregation, limited black job opportunities and kept Black Americans from voting—
remained in effect during the 1960s) and African American achievements (e.g., 
Fredrick Douglas, born a slave, escaped and became America's most prominent 
abolitionist and anti-slavery agitator during the 19th century). First, participants 
indicated whether the history item was true or false. Then participants used a 5 point 
Likert scale (1 = guessing; 5 = certain) to indicate the level of confidence in their 
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answer. Seventeen of these items were “true” while the remaining eight items were 
“false” (see Appendix).  
I analyzed data using a signal detection paradigm that measures knowledge of 
Black history while controlling for guessing (Adams & Nelson, 2008). History scores 
were calculated by subtracting z-score false alarm rates from z-score hit rates. Hits 
denote that participants indicated a history item as “True” when, in fact, the item was 
true. False alarms convey participants indicated an item as “True” when the item was 
actually false. Higher scores on this index (d’) reflect detection sensitivity; that is, the 
ability to identify true history items without being “distracted” by false items. I 
incorporated certainty information by counting a response as "correct" only when 
participants indicated certainty of 3 or greater. 
Results 
For data analyses, I retained only participants who indicated "American" as 
their national identity (n = 182). In addition, I retained only those Kansas participants 
who self-identified as White or Caucasian (n = 85) and those Howard participants 
who identified as Black or African American (n = 65).  
Preliminary versions of the analyses below included order as a factor in the 
design. These analyses revealed no main effects of order or interactions involving 
order for any of the dependent measures. As a result, I report analyses without order 
as a factor in the design. 
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Group Differences 
 The purpose of this study is to examine group differences in perception of 
racism from a cultural perspective. As a first step, I conducted analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) on all dependent measures with gender (male = 0, female = 1) and racial 
group (Black = 0, White = 1) as between-subjects factors. These analyses revealed 
extensive main effects of gender and racial group. With two exceptions that I describe 
shortly, gender did not interact with racial group.  
Identification 
Results for measures of racial identification indicated main effects of racial 
group on racial centrality, F (1, 146) = 16.97, p < .001, and racial private regard, F (1, 
146) = 3.77, p = .054. White participants reported that their racial identity was less 
central to their identity than did the Black participants. Additionally, White 
participants reported lower levels of private regard for their racial identity than did 
the Black participants. There were no effects of gender, either by itself or in 
interaction with racial group, Fs(1, 146) < 1  (Means and standard deviations for each 
variable appear in Table 2).  
Results for measures of national identification revealed a different pattern. 
White participants reported that American identity was more central to their identity 
than did the Black participants, F(1, 146) = 4.37, p = .038; likewise, White 
participants reported higher private regard for American identity than did Black 
participants, F(1, 146) = 20.10, p < .001.  
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Table 2 
 Racial group by gender means and standard deviations. 
 Black Americans White Americans  
 Women 
(n = 53) 
Men 
(n = 12) 
Women 
(n = 39) 
Men 
(n = 46) 
 
Racial Private Regard 6.37 (0.77) 6.38 (0.96) 6.21 (0.85) 5.92 (0.81) 6.18 (0.83) 
Racial Centrality 5.07 (1.17) 4.88 (1.15) 3.84 (1.46) 3.99 (1.40) 4.25 (1.43) 
National Private Regard 5.78 (1.02) 5.25 (1.35) 6.22 (0.90) 6.41 (0.65) 6.05 (0.99) 
National Centrality 4.26 (1.08) 4.06 (1.36) 4.33 (1.23) 4.96 (1.26) 4.47 (1.22) 
Note: Cells contain means (and standard deviations) for each group. 
 
Similar to work by Sidanius and colleagues (1997) on ethnic and national 
attachment, the present pattern of results indicates that racial-ethnic and national 
identity resonates differently for members of the racial majority and minority. White 
American participants reported less racial identification (private regard and centrality) 
than did Black American participants; but, White American participants reported 
more national identification (private regard and centrality) than did the Black 
American participants.  
The main effects of gender were non-significant; however, there was a 
significant interaction of school and gender for national private regard, F(1, 146) = 
4.06, p = .046, and a marginal interaction of school and gender for national centrality, 
F(1, 146) = 3.10, p = .081. To interpret the interactions, I examined racial group 
differences separately for male and female participants. Simple effects tests on 
national private regard indicated that racial group differences were particularly true of 
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men, F(1, 146) = 16.18, p < .001, and smaller, but still significant, for women, F(1, 
146) = 5.65, p = .019, (see Table 2). Simple effects tests on national centrality 
indicated that racial group differences were true of men, F(1, 146) = 10.11, p = .002, 
but not true of the women, F(1, 146) < 1 (see Table 2).  
Racism denial 
 Results revealed the hypothesized main effect of racial group on racism 
denial, F (1, 144) = 68.94, p < .001. Kansas participants (M = 4.42, SD = 1.01) 
endorsed claims minimizing and denying the role of racism in Hurricane Katrina  
more than did the Howard participants (M = 2.73, SD = .96). There were no effects of 
gender, either by itself, F(1, 144) = 2.32, p = .13, or in interaction with racial group, 
F(1, 144) < 1 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3 
Racial group by gender means and standard deviations 
 Black Americans White Americans  
 Women 
(n = 53) 
Men 
(n = 12) 
Women 
(n = 39) 
Men 
(n = 46) 
 
 
Racism Denial 2.70 (0.92) 2.89 (1.17) 4.21 (1.12) 4.61 (0.88) 3.67 (1.27) 
Systemic Racism  4.87 (0.93) 4.16 (1.58) 2.80 (1.28) 2.49 (1.14) 3.58 (1.57) 
Individualistic Racism  6.06 (0.68) 5.48 (1.14) 4.43 (1.34) 3.96 (1.24) 4.98 (1.33) 
Conception of Racism 9.38 (3.77) 7.66 (3.42) 7.45 (3.66) 7.46 (3.52) 8.31 (3.61) 
Historical Knowledge (d') 1.27 (0.74) 1.06 (0.41) 0.60 (0.59) 0.57 (0.55) 0.86 (0.71) 
Note: Cells contain means (and standard deviations) for each group. 
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Perceptions of racism 
Results revealed the hypothesized main effects of racial group on perceptions 
of racism in the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Consistent with previous 
research, perception of systemic manifestations of racism in Katrina-related events 
was lower among White participants (M = 2.63, SD = 1.21) than among Black 
participants (M = 4.74, SD = 1.10), F(1,146) = 70.59, p < .001. Similarly, perception 
of individualistic manifestations of racism in Katrina-related events was lower among 
White participants (M = 4.17, SD = 1.30) than among Black participants (M = 5.95, 
SD = .81), F(1,146) = 70.59, p < .001. 
To the extent that the identity relevance of racism perception is greater for 
systemic manifestations than for isolated incidents, one can hypothesize parallel 
group differences in perception of racism. To test this hypothesis, I performed a 
mixed-model ANOVA with racial group as a between-participants factor and racism 
type as the within-participants factor. Besides the main effect of racial group noted in 
the previous paragraph, there was a main effect of racism type F(1,148) = 231.75, p < 
.001, such that participants perceived more racism in the individualistic scenarios (M 
= 4.95, SD = 1.42) than the systemic scenarios (M = 3.55, SD = 1.56). The relevant 
Racism Type x Racial group interaction testing the hypothesized difference in size of 
racial group effect across racism type was marginally significant, F(1,148) = 3.27, p = 
.073. Considered as differences in racism type within racial group, both White and 
Black participants perceived more racism in the individualistic events than systemic 
 28 
manifestations, but the difference was larger among White participants t(84) = -12.04, 
p < .001,  than among Black participants, t(64)= -9.98, p < .001.   
There was a main effect of gender on perceptions of systemic racism in 
Hurricane Katrina, F(1,146) = 5.24, p = .024. Women (M = 3.99, SD = 1.50) reported 
more racism in the systemic manifestations of racism surrounding Hurricane Katrina 
than did men (M = 2.84, SD = 1.40). Women (M = 5.37, SD = 1.29) also perceived 
more racism in the individualistic scenarios than did men (M = 4.27, SD = 1.36), F(1, 
146) = 6.11, p = .015. The interactions involving racial group and gender were non-
significant, Fs(1, 146) < 1. 
Conceptions of Racism 
White participants (M = 7.45, SD = 3.56) endorsed a less systemic conception 
of racism than did the Black participants (M = 9.10, SD = 3.73). Likewise, men (M = 
7.49, SD = 3.47) endorsed a less systemic conception of racism than did women (M = 
8.55, SD = 3.82). However, ANOVA results indicate that these effects did not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance, F(1,143) = 2.07, p = .153 and F(1,143) 
= 1.32, p = .252, respectively (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations of each 
design cell). 
Historical Knowledge 
As anticipated, Black participants performed better on the measure of Black 
history knowledge than did the Black participants. This was primarily evident in a 
main effect of racial group on the rate of hits (i.e., saying "True" when, in fact, the 
item was true; Black M = .66, SD = .16; White M = .37, SD = .15), F(1,136) = 65.90, 
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p < .001. In contrast, there was no effect of racial group on rate of false alarms (i.e., 
saying "True" when, in fact, the item was false; Black M = .25, SD = .15; White M = 
.21, SD = .15). This suggests that while Black participants were more likely than 
White participants to say true when the item was indeed true, they were no more 
likely than White participants to say true when the item was actually false. 
In Signal Detection Theory, the statistic d' takes into account information 
about rate of hits and false alarms to provide a unified index of the tendency to 
correctly discriminate true information from false information . A 2 X 2 ANOVA 
indicated that Howard participants (M = 1.24, SD = .70) scored higher on this 
measure of historical knowledge than did the Kansas participants (M = .58, SD = 
.57), F(1,135) = 19.41, p < .001. There were no effects of gender, either by itself, F(1, 
136) = 1.03, p = .312 or in interaction with racial group, F < 1 (see Table 2). 
Mediation Effects: A Closer look at history knowledge 
Can knowledge of history explain the group differences in perceptions of 
racism? In light of the racial differences observed in the data, I conducted a series of 
simple mediational analyses using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure. Mediational 
analyses assess whether the racial differences in historical knowledge can account for 
racial differences in perceptions of racism.  
History Knowledge  
First, I tested whether overall Black history knowledge, computed as d', 
mediated the relationship between racial group and racism denial. Racial group was a 
reliable predictor of history knowledge (β = -.459, p < .001) and racism denial (β = 
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.648, p < .001). However, when simultaneously entered into the regression model 
with racial group, history knowledge did not remain a significant predictor (β = - 103, 
p = .16); thus, there is little evidence or reason to test for mediation on this variable.   
Next, I tested whether d', mediated the relationship between racial group and 
perceptions of systemic racism. Racial group was a reliable predictor of history 
knowledge (β = -.459, p < .001) and perceptions of systemic racism (β = -.670, p < 
.001). When simultaneously entered into the regression model with racial group, 
history knowledge remained a significant predictor (β = .195, p = .006), and partially 
mediated the relationship between racial group and perceptions of systemic racism in 
Hurricane Katrina (see Figure 1). Although the relationship between racial group and 
systemic racism remained significant, (β = -.583, p < .001), these analyses provide  
some support for hypothesis 2b. A Sobel's (1982) test confirmed that the indirect 
relationship between racial group and systemic racism perceptions, as mediated 
through history knowledge, differed from zero, z = -2.54, p = .011.  
 
Figure 1. Test of the hypothesis that racial group difference in perception of systemic racism is 
mediated by history knowledge.  
History Knowledge 
 
Note. Racial group coded as Black = 0 and White = 1. Numbers represent standardized beta 
coefficients, with parentheses representing beta coefficients when racial group and history 
knowledge are entered simultaneously. *p < .05, **p < .01,  ***p <.001 






I then tested whether d' mediated the relationship between racial group and 
perceptions of individualistic manifestations of racism. Racial group was a reliable 
predictor of history knowledge (β = -.459, p < .001) and perceptions of individualistic 
racism (β = -.373, p < .001). However, when simultaneously entered into the 
regression model with racial group, history knowledge was only a marginally 
significant predictor (β = .377, p = .10), and evidence for mediation did not reach 
conventional levels of significance, Sobel’s z = -1.60, p = .11.  
Moderation effects: Engagement with identity and history   
 Thus far, this research replicates previous work demonstrating racial group 
differences in perceptions of racism. There is some evidence that one aspect of 
cultural engagement (i.e., history knowledge) can account for these differences. To 
further investigate the role of cultural engagement and how historical knowledge and 
identity might interact to inform perceptions of racism. I conducted two sets of 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Each set of analyses 
first tested the relationships of the hypothesized predictors (i.e., racial group, identity, 
and history knowledge) with the dependent variables and then tested the higher order 
moderating relationships with each predictor (the interaction terms). The first set of 
analyses examined moderating effects of the racial identity subscales. The second set 
of analyses examined moderating effects of national identity subscales. 
Racial Identity and History Knowledge 
The analyses that follow investigate this relationship with multiple dimensions 
of racial identification (centrality and private regard), while simultaneously 
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examining the role of historical knowledge (computed as d'). To the extent that White 
and Black participants identify with their respective racial entities, racial/ethnic 
private regard should be negatively related to perceptions of racism among the White 
participants; but, among the Black participants, private regard should be positively 
related to perceptions of racism. In addition, racial centrality should be positively 
related to perceptions of racism among the White and Black American participants. 
Furthermore, the relationships of historical knowledge with perceptions of racism in 
the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina should be independent of these identity 
concerns. 
Claims of Racism Denial. The linear combination of racial group (β = .657, p 
< .001), historical knowledge (β = -.110, p = .130), racial/ethnic private regard (β = 
.071, p = .297), and racial/ethnic centrality (β = .072, p = .317) was a significant 
predictor of racism denial, F (4, 132) = 28.26, p < .001. When included with the 
higher order interactions, the effect of racial group remained significant, but was 
qualified by a three-way interaction with racial private regard, and history knowledge 
(β = .372, p = .006, see Figure 2).2 To interpret this interaction, I regressed racism 
denial on historical knowledge and racial private regard separately within each racial 
group. The 2-way interaction between history knowledge and racial private regard 
was significant among the White participants (β = .469, p = .004), but not the Black 
participants (β = -.129, p = .511). The simple slope for low identifying White 
Americans was -.97, and the simple slope for high identifying White Americans was  
                                                 
2 Simple slopes and Figures 2-9 were generated using a web-based computational tool for probing 
interactions (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). 
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-.43. The simple slope for low identifying Black Americans was .32, and the simple 
slope for high identifying Black Americans was -.40. Simple slope t-test analyses 
revealed that the lines at each moderator level did not significantly differ from zero, 
ps >.28.  
Figure 2. Racial group x racial private regard x history knowledge interaction for 
endorsement of claims denying racism in Hurricane Katrina interaction  
 
Perceptions of Systemic Racism. The linear combination of racial group (β = -
.575, p < .001), historical knowledge (β = .191, p = .006), racial/ethnic private regard 
(β = -.099, p = .128), and racial/ethnic centrality (β = .155, p = .025) was a significant 
predictor of perceptions of systemic racism, F (4, 134) = 34.12, p < .001. When 
included with the higher order interactions, the effect of racial group remained 
significant but was qualified by a three-way interaction with racial private regard and 
history knowledge (β = -.259, p = .042, see Figure 3). To interpret this interaction, I 
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regressed perceptions of systemic racism on historical knowledge and racial private 
regard separately within each racial group. The 2-way interaction between history 
knowledge and racial private regard was significant among the White participants (β 
= -.349, p = .024) but not the Black participants (β = .096, p = .616). The simple slope 
for low identifying White Americans was 1.25, and the simple slope for high 
identifying White Americans was -.07. The simple slope for low identifying Black 
Americans was -.10, and the simple slope for high identifying Black Americans was 
.39. Simple slope t-test analyses revealed that the lines at each moderator level did not 
differ significantly from zero, ps >.21.  
 
Figure 3. Racial group x racial private regard x history knowledge for perception of systemic 
racism in Hurricane Katrina interaction 
 
These results revealed hypothesized racial group differences, such that White 
participants perceived less systemic racism in Hurricane Katrina than the Black 
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participants did. This relationship was moderated by history and identity, such that for 
White participants scoring relatively low on the private regard dimension of racial 
identity, perceptions of systemic racism increased with history knowledge.  
Regression results also revealed a marginal, three-way interaction of racial group, 
historical knowledge, and racial/ethnic centrality, (β =.238, p = .053; see Figure 4). 
Again, to interpret this interaction, I regressed perceptions of systemic racism on 
historical knowledge and racial centrality separately within each racial group. The 2-
way interaction between history knowledge and racial centrality was significant 
among the White participants (β = .475, p = .002). Among the Black participants, 
perceptions of systemic racism do not appear to change as a function of racial 
centrality and history knowledge (β = .006, p = .981). The simple slope for low 
identifying White Americans was -.25, and the simple slope for high identifying 
White Americans was 1.42. The simple slope for low identifying Black Americans 
was .06, and the simple slope for high identifying Black Americans was .23. Simple 
slope t-test analyses revealed that the lines at each moderator level did not differ from 
zero, ps >.19.  
In contrast to the previous moderating relationship of private regard and 
history, high racial centrality was associated with increased perceptions of systemic 
racism among White participants with history knowledge. Perception of systemic 
racism in Hurricane Katrina does not seem to change as a function of history 
knowledge for Kansas participants’ whose race is not a central aspect of their identity. 
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Among the Howard participants, perceptions of systemic racism did not appear to 
change as a function of racial centrality and history knowledge. 
Figure 4. Racial group x racial centrality x history knowledge interaction for perceptions of 
systemic racism in Hurricane Katrina 
 
 
Perceptions of Individualistic Racism. The linear combination of racial group 
(β = -.545, p < .001), historical knowledge (β = .126, p = .103), racial/ethnic private 
regard (β = -.009, p = .906), and racial/ethnic centrality (β = .006, p = .937) was a 
significant predictor of racism perception in individual events, F (4, 134) = 23.03, p < 
.001. When included with the higher order interactions, the effect of racial group 
remained significant. There was a significant three-way interaction of racial group, 
racial/ethnic centrality, and history knowledge (β = .266, p = .050). The positive 
relationship between history knowledge and perceptions of individual racism was 
primarily true of the White participants for whom racial/ethnic identity was central 
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(see Figure 5). In order to interpret this interaction, I regressed perceptions of 
individualistic racism on historical knowledge and racial centrality separately within 
each racial group. The 2-way interaction between history knowledge and racial 
centrality was significant among the White participants (β = .425, p = .007), but not 
the Black participants (β = -.051, p = .841). This mirrors the pattern observed for 
systemic racism. Again, high racial centrality and history knowledge are positively 
associated with increased perceptions of racism among the White participants. The 
simple slope for low identifying White Americans was -.23, and the simple slope for 
high identifying White Americans was 1.30. The simple slope for low identifying 
Black Americans was -.09, and the simple slope for high identifying Black Americans 
was .01. Simple slope t-test analyses revealed that the lines at each moderator level 
did not differ from zero, ps >.24. 
Conceptions of Racism. The linear combination of racial group (β = -.130, p = 
.197), historical knowledge (β = .187, p = .049), racial/ethnic private regard (β = -
.031, p = .728), and racial/ethnic centrality (β = .027, p = .774) was a significant 
predictor of tendencies to indicate a systemic conception of racism, F (4, 125) = 2.77, 
p = .030. In this case, history knowledge was the only significant predictor in the 
main effects model. When included in the model with the higher order interactions, 
history knowledge did not remain a significant predictor. Instead, there was a 
significant interaction of racial private regard and history knowledge, β = .473, p = 
.004, qualified by a higher-order (i.e., three-way) interaction with racial group; β = -
.509, p = .004; see Figure 6. 
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Figure 5. Racial group X race centrality X history knowledge interaction for perceptions of 
individualistic racism  
 
 
Figure 6. Racial group x racial private regard x history knowledge interaction for conception 
of racism 
Note. Higher numbers indicate more systemic conceptions of racism 
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To interpret these results, I regressed conception of racism on historical 
knowledge and racial private regard separately within each racial group. The 2-way 
interaction between history knowledge and racial private regard was not significant 
among the White participants (β = -.227, p = .184), instead, the 2-way interaction was 
primarily true among the Black participants (β = .499, p = .010). The simple slope for 
low identifying White Americans was 2.66, p < .001, and the simple slope for high 
identifying White Americans was -0.02, t < 1. The simple slope for low identifying 
Black Americans was -2.56, p=0.08, and the simple slope for high identifying Black 
Americans was =2.93, p =007. Subsequent simple slope analyses revealed that only 
one of the simple slopes did not at least marginally differ from zero. 
Results revealed that the more some participants knew about Black history, 
the more participants endorsed a systemic conception of racism. Among Black 
participants who positively regarded their racial identity, knowledge of history was 
positively related to endorsement of a systemic conception of racism. For White 
participants reporting low racial private regard, knowledge of history was positively 
related to systemic conceptions of racism as well. Conversely, among Black 
participants who reported low levels of racial private regard, knowledge of history 
was negatively related to endorsement of systemic conceptions of racism. Among 
White participants reporting high racial private regard, history knowledge appears 
unrelated to endorsement of systemic racism conceptions.  
National Identity and History Knowledge  
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Similar to the previous section, I conducted hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses to investigate the relationships of history and multiple dimensions of 
national identity with the dependent variables. Unlike the previous section on racial    
identity and history, national identity is an identity category that White and Black 
participants share. For this reason, one can hypothesize that national private regard is 
negatively related to perceptions of racism in both communities.  
 Claims of Racism Denial. The linear combination of racial group (β = .520, p 
< .001), historical knowledge (β = -.111, p = .101), national private regard (β = .267, 
p < .001), and national centrality (β = .072, p = .286) was a significant predictor of 
racism denial, F (4, 134) = 38.01, p < .001. When included with the higher order 
interactions the effect of racial group remained significant (β = .477, p < .001), but 
was qualified by several higher-order interactions, including two-way interactions 
with private regard (β = .318, p = .010 and history knowledge (β = -.294, p = .014); 
by a three way interaction of racial group, history knowledge, and national private 
regard, (β = .263, p = .040), and a 4-way interaction of racial group, history 
knowledge, national private regard, and national centrality, (β = .435, p = .013). In 
order to interpret this four-way interaction, I regressed racism denial on history 
knowledge, private regard, and identity centrality separately within each racial group. 
This analysis revealed a significant, three-way interaction of history knowledge, 
national private regard, and national centrality for the White participants (β = .580, p 
= .016). Figure 7 illustrates the nature of this interaction. The results reveal the 
hypothesized relationship between history knowledge and racism denial only for 
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White participants who are both (a) low in racial private regard and (b) high in racial 
identity centrality.  
7. National centrality x national private regard x history knowledge interaction for 
endorsement of claims denying racism in Hurricane Katrina  
                                                                                                                                                                        
Note. This interaction represents the White American participants only. 
 
Subsequent simple slope analyses revealed that only one of simple slopes 
significantly differed from zero: the simple slope for low identifying White 
Americans was -2.85, p = .05. The lines at each of the other moderator levels did not 
differ from zero, ps >.58. The simple slope for low centrality and low private regard 
was -.11; the simple slope for low centrality and high private regard was -.56; and the  
simple slope for high centrality and high private regard was -.25.  
These results suggest that to the extent that White participants indicated low 
national private regard, but high national centrality, knowledge of history negatively 
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relates to racism denial. Otherwise, history knowledge did not appear to moderate the 
relationships of national identity with racism denial.  
Perceptions of Systemic Racism. The linear combination of racial group (β = -
.516, p < .001), historical knowledge (β = .201, p = .003), national private regard (β = 
-.205, p = .004), and national centrality (β = -.031, p = .643) was a significant 
predictor of racism perception in systemic manifestations, F (4, 134) = 37.26, p < 
.001. When included in the model with the higher order interactions, only the main 
effect of racial group remained significant. This main effect was qualified by a 2-way 
interaction of racial group and national private regard (β = -.274, p = .023; see Figure 
8). To interpret this interaction, I examined the relationship between private regard 
and perceptions of systemic racism separately within each racial group. Results 
indicated that the negative relationship between national private regard and 
perceptions of racism in systemic manifestations was particularly true of White 
participants (β = -.593, p <.001). Although not significant, the relationship was 
slightly negative for Black participants, as well (β = -.177, p = .358). Simple slope 
analyses revealed that the slopes for the Black and White American participants did 
not differ from zero, ps >.19. 
Results suggest a significant relationship between historical knowledge and 
perceptions of systemic racism, even when controlling for the national identity 
subscales. Historical knowledge was positively related to perceptions of systemic 
racism and was not qualified by any higher order interactions. National private regard 
was negatively related to perceptions of systemic racism. Although seemingly the 
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case for both communities, it was particularly true among the White American 
participants.  
Figure 8. Racial group x national private regard interaction for perception of systemic racism 
in Hurricane Katrina 
 
Perceptions of Individualistic Racism. The linear combination of racial group 
(β = -.187, p < .001), historical knowledge (β = .033, p = .085), national private 
regard (β = -.049, p = .014), and national centrality (β = -.020, p = .288) was 
significantly related to perception of racism in isolated, individual events, F (4, 134) 
= 25.13, p < .001. When included in the model with the higher order interactions, the 
effect of racial group remained significant, but was again qualified by a 2-way 
interaction of racial group and national private regard (β = -.076, p = .019). To  
interpret this interaction, I again examined the relationship between private regard 
and perceptions of individualistic racism separately within each racial group (see 
Figure 9). Results indicated that the negative relationship between national private 
regard and perception of racism in isolated, individual events was more true of the 
 44 
White participants (β = -.384, p = .010), than the Black participants (β = -.100, p = 
.614). Simple slope analyses revealed that the slopes for White and Black Americans 
did not differ from zero, ps >.30.    
 
Figure 9. Racial group x national private regard interaction for perceptions of individualistic 
racism in Hurricane Katrina 
 
  Similarly to the results for systemic racism, national private regard was 
negatively related to perceptions of individualistic forms of racism. Although 
seemingly the case for both communities, again, it was particularly true among the 
White participants. 
Conception of Racism. The linear combination of racial group (β = -.130, p = 
.189), historical knowledge (β = .206, p = .032), national private regard (β = -.136, p 
= .173), and national centrality (β = .067, p = .488) was a significant predictor of 
tendencies to indicate a systemic conception of racism, F (4, 125) = 3.78, p = .006. 
History knowledge was the only significant predictor in this main effects model, and 
the model did not suggest any higher order interactions. The present research suggests 
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that believing that racism stems from social and cultural structures is related to 
knowledge of historical racism. 
Relationships among the predictor variables 
Table 4 summarizes the correlation coefficients among the hypothesized 
predictor and dependent variables for the White and Black participants. Although I 
did not directly test the predictive relationships between cultural engagement 
variables, the correlations suggest that in addition to being related to perceptions of 
racism, they are also related to each other. Among the White participants, racial 
private regard was positively related to the other identity variables: racial centrality (r 
= .24, p = .025), and national private regard (r = .37, p < .001). Similarly, racial 
centrality was positively related to national centrality (r = .42, p < .001). National 
private regard and national centrality were moderately correlated (r = .44, p < .001). 
With the exception of national private regard (r = .20, p = .077), the identity variables 
were not related to knowledge of history among the White participants. Among the 
Black participants, racial private regard was positively related to the other racial 
identity subscale (r = .32, p = .009), but negatively or unrelated to the national private 
regard (r = .07, p = .601) and national centrality (r = -.24, p = .58). However, racial 
centrality was positively related to national private regard (r = .29, p = .020) and 
national centrality (r = .14, p = .263). History knowledge was unrelated or negatively 
related to measures of national identity (private regard, r = -.09, p = .514; centrality, r 
= -.17, p= .209), but positively related to measures of racial identity (private regard, r 
= .14, p = .275; centrality, r = .10, p = .447) among the Black participants.  
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Discussion 
The present results provide support for a cultural psychology perspective and 
the primary hypotheses in this study. First, the present research replicates previous 
findings of racial group differences in perception of racism in ambiguous events (e.g., 
Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Adams, 
Tormala, O’Brien, 2006). White American participants attending a PWI perceived 
less racism in Katrina-relevant events; expressed greater endorsement of statements 
that deny a role for racism in Katrina; endorsed systemic conceptions of racism less, 
and scored lower on a measure of accurate history knowledge that incorporated 
instances of historical racism than did the Black American participants attending a 
HBI (H1). Of additional interest, the results also replicate previous findings of group 
differences in levels of identification (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997). The White 
American participants reported less racial identification (private regard and centrality) 
than did Black American participants; but, White American participants reported 
more national identification (private regard and centrality) than did the Black 
American participants. 
Second, given the consistency of the racial differences in perception across 
various scenarios and time, this study also sought to investigate potential cultural 
explanations of why these perceptual differences might persist. One explanation 
proposed is an aspect of cultural engagement: Black History knowledge. Specifically, 
this study proposed that differences in perception of racism might be explained by 
differences in knowledge of historical racism. There was some support for the 
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mediational hypothesis. Knowledge of Black history partially mediated the 
differences on systemic manifestations of racism in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. This suggests that an aspect of the racial differences in perceptions of 
systemic racism might be explained by differences in historical knowledge. Although 
correlational in design, this study suggests that engagement with Black American 
cultural constructions of the past might influence racism perceptions in present-day 
events. 
 Important aspects of cultural engagement, various identity constructions, are 
a second set of variables of explanatory interest in this study. When conceptualized as 
cultural engagement, one can consider identification with a category as active 
participation in the construction of what that identity category means. Furthermore, 
one can consider the meanings and ideologies constituting any identity category and 
their implications for interpreting the social world.  
 Previous research found that racial private regard was negatively related to 
beliefs in conspiracies allegedly perpetrated against Blacks by the U.S. government 
among White Americans, but positively related to belief in conspiracies among Black 
Americans (Crocker et al., 1999). To the extent that anti-black conspiracies include 
claims of racism, previous studies suggest that perceptions of racism might be linked 
to Black and White racial identity. Results in the present study provide evidence that 
engagement with various racial identity constructions are related to perceptions of 
racism in the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Supporting hypothesis 2a, racial 
private regard was negatively related to perceptions of systemic racism among White 
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Americans and positively related to racism denial; however, there is little evidence 
that perception of racism is related to racial private regard among the Black American 
participants in this study (see bivariate correlations, Table 4).  
Although the present study does not replicate the relationship found among 
the Black participants by Crocker and colleagues, this lack of relationship between 
racism perception and this specific aspect of identity is consistent with other research 
findings. For instance, racial private regard was unrelated to past and future 
attributions to prejudice in a study on well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999). Perhaps, 
there is a ceiling effect suppressing the relationship between racial private regard and 
racism perception in the Black American sample (the mean was 6.37 on a 7 point 
scale). Alternatively, it may be that perceiving racism is linked to both increased and 
decreased private regard for Black racial identity depending on individual differences 
in what it means to be Black (e.g., whether what it means to be Black is grounded in 
an experience of oppression versus having a unique culture; on different meanings of 
Black identity, see Sellers et al., 1998).    
There is support for hypothesis 2b, as well. Overall, when controlling for 
racial private regard (and history knowledge), racial centrality is positively related to 
perceptions of systemic racism. While the positive relationship between racial 
identity and perceptions of racism might seem surprising for the White American 
participants, this finding is consistent with work on group-based guilt (Roccas et al., 
2006). Results suggest that when controlling for identity dimensions that only 
consider the positive aspects of one’s group identity (private regard), White 
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participants who felt their race was an important aspect of their identity (i.e., 
centrality) denied or minimized events that ostensibly implicate their group in a 
negative fashion (i.e., admitting the possibility of racism in Katrina-related events) 
less than those who reported that their race was not a central part of their identity (see 
Figure 3). This finding did not extend to perceptions of individualistic manifestations 
of racism. Perhaps this is because perceiving racism in individualistic forms is less 
identity-relevant than perceiving systemic manifestations of racism in Katrina related 
events. Evidence for this possibility comes from the larger racial group differences on 
the measure of systemic racism than the individualistic racism perception measure. 
This study also found some support for the hypotheses regarding engagement 
with American identity. Consistent with the predictions, national private regard was 
negatively related to perceptions of systemic and individualistic manifestations of 
racism, and positively related to racism denial in both communities (H3a). As 
predicted, this relationship is stronger among the White American participants (see 
Table 4). However, there was little evidence to support hypothesis 3b. If anything, 
bivariate correlations suggest a negative relationship between nation centrality 
perceptions of racism (Table 4). Overall, when controlling for identity dimensions 
that only consider the positive aspects of national identity (and history knowledge), 
national centrality is not related to perceptions of racism (systemic and 
individualistic), or racism denial (βs ranging from -.031 to .072).  
Additionally, there is some empirical support for Du Bois’ “Double 
Consciousness” in the present data. For Black American participants, to the extent 
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that race was a central and important aspect of their identity, there was a positive 
relationship between racial identity and perceptions of racism (although not 
significant by conventional standards). However, to the extent that their national 
identity was a positively regarded and an important aspect of their identity, 
participants perceived less racism in Hurricane Katrina. This was also true of the 
White American participants in this study. Perhaps a liberal extension of Du Bois’ 
ideas, one might suggest that the racial centrality data involving White Americans 
suggest that viewing oneself through the lens of race in general—whether Black or 
White—represents a paradox when viewing oneself through the lens of American 
national identity. 
Lastly, there is support for the fourth hypothesis regarding history knowledge 
and perceptions of racism (H4). As previously discussed, historical knowledge 
mediated the racial group differences in perception of racism in Hurricane Katrina-
related events. However, independent of various racial and national identity 
constructions, accurate knowledge of historical instances of racism and African 
American achievements remained positively related to perceiving racism and 
endorsement of systemic conceptions of racism, and negatively related to 
endorsement of claims that deny racism in Hurricane Katrina.  
Interestingly, many of these relationships were qualified by 3-way interactions 
of history knowledge with racial group and the various identity constructions. 
Consistent across the dependent measures, perceptions of racism were positively 
related to Black history knowledge among White American participants considered 
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“low identifiers” on the private regard dimension of racial identity and “high 
identifiers” on the centrality dimension of racial identity. This pattern is illustrated in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 (this pattern is also illustrated in Figure 2, but as a negative 
relationship since the dependent variable is denial).  
Endorsement of a systemic conception of racism was also qualified by an 
interaction of history knowledge with racial group and racial private regard. Among 
Black American participants considered “high identifiers” on racial private regard, 
the more they knew about Black History, the more they endorsed a systemic 
conception of racism. Among Black Americans participants considered “low 
identifiers” on racial private regard, the more they knew about Black history, the less 
they endorsed systemic conceptions of racism. Although an unanticipated result, one 
might suggest that while high identifiers might prefer conceptions of racism as 
individual bias and low identifiers might prefer a more socio-cultural conception, 
knowledge of history encourages conceptions of racism that include both (hence, 
responses meeting at the midpoint of the scale).  
Careful Consideration of the facts  
The primary goal of this study was to provide a less pathologizing explanation 
of the racial group differences in perception of racism. Instead of locating perceptions 
of racism in something about exaggerated beliefs or paranoia, I examined perceptions 
of racism as culturally grounded phenomena reflecting resonance with culturally-
patterned worlds. Of special consideration in this study, Black history knowledge is 
one possible indicator of engagement with narratives about racism present in the 
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Black community. Racial identity is another. However, one might suggest that there 
is little evidence signaling that perceptions of racism among the Black American 
participants were actually culturally grounded. Although correlations between history 
knowledge and perceptions of racism were in the hypothesized directions, they were 
non-significant. Similarly, with the exception of one non-significant positive 
relationship between racial centrality and systemic racism, racial identity seemed 
unrelated to perceptions of racism among Black American participants.  
One explanation, as suggested by the opening quote, is that cultural 
engagement variables are unrelated to perceptions of racism because Black 
Americans are indeed paranoid; thus, they subsequently (over) perceive racism in 
events like Hurricane Katrina. However, if one is to come to that conclusion, then one 
must concede that the same must be true of White Americans who are armed with 
accurate knowledge of the historical past. The present results suggest that White 
American participants who are open to critical narratives about the past, perceived 
Katrina-related events similarly to the Black American participants. Furthermore, 
Black American participants were no more likely than White American participants 
were to incorrectly identify “false” items as “true”. In other words, Black American 
responses to items regarding historical racism reflect knowledge—not a tendency to 
believe anything that sounds like racism to be true. Because the measure of historical 
knowledge incorporated instances of historical racism, this suggests that Black 
American participants did carefully assess potential instances of racism (in the past 
and present).  
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Turning the Lens 
 Notably, in an effort to provide a less pathologizing account of Black 
American perceptions, a cultural psychology analysis illuminated several variables 
pertinent to understanding the psychology of White American perceptions of racism. 
This research suggests that White American disbeliefs about the presence of racism in 
Hurricane Katrina  is related to cultural engagement with mainstream American 
history narratives and cultural understandings that leave out systemic manifestations 
and conceptions of racism. When forced to choose a conception of racism, White 
American participants endorsed a less systemic definition than did the Black 
American participants (although this difference was marginal). This is consistent with 
work that suggests that White Americans prefer a less systemic conception of racism 
(e.g., Adams et al., in press; O’Brien et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, research suggests that perceiving social inequality and injustice 
in American society can be somewhat threatening to a positive American identity 
(e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). Consistent with this idea, 
American private regard was consistently and negatively related to perceptions of 
racism in this study. Interestingly, independent of any identity-related defensiveness 
(captured in private regard), White American participants who knew more about 
Black history and said race mattered in their lives (i.e., racial centrality), were more 
likely to say the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina might be due to racism. 
Limitations and future directions  
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One potential limitation of this study is that the racial differences observed are 
not independent of institution type. This likely prompts the question as to whether the 
differences observed are due to race or institutional context. The White American 
participants are from a predominately White institution and the Black American 
participants are from a historically Black institution. In the present study, these two 
variables cannot be easily disentangled. Importantly, each sample comes from an 
institution in which the participants are members of the majority and in both contexts, 
racial identity is not likely to be a source of rejection (Postmes & Branscombe, 2002), 
but positively reinforced. Thus, it is equally likely that the differences observed are 
the product of engagement with a particular culture (which in this case, conventional 
standards typically refer to as race), or the cultural settings. Ideally, a larger sample of 
White Americans from the HBI or a larger sample of Black Americans from the PWI 
would allow further analysis of this idea. However, the focus of the study was to 
compare two different communities (whether based on race or institution) with 
divergent perceptions of racism and for who collective representations associated 
with identity and knowledge of historical racism were likely to differ substantially.  
Another limitation of the present research is the correlational design of the 
study. Cultural engagement variables were measured rather than manipulated. 
Although one might suggest a measure of “knowledge” should be relatively stable, 
causal directions cannot be ascertained. Although I suggest knowledge of history 
inform perceptions of racism, it is equally plausible that perceptions of racism in 
present-day America aids recall of knowledge about racism in the past. Moreover, 
 56 
this Black history test only represents a small amount of historical knowledge that 
people have available to them to draw upon.  
Future research should address the present limitations of this study by 
utilizing increased sample sizes. Many of the non-significant findings were in the 
hypothesized directions (particularly among the simple slopes analyses) and might be 
due to low power. Increased sample sizes might also allow for further exploration of 
race and institution effects. In addition, future research would benefit from employing 
experimental designs to further investigate the relationships between the cultural 
engagement variables and perceptions of racism. For instance, manipulating historical 
knowledge content and identity would illuminate their possible effects on perception 
of racism. Remaining for future consideration are the links between history and 
identity, and the consequences of perceiving racism for these variables (e.g., 
reconstructing the past).   
Implications 
The present research tries to highlight the utility of a cultural analysis. This 
research suggests that work grounded in the perspectives of the oppressed is 
theoretically rich and not by any means limited to “the minority experience.” 
Specifically, by utilizing this perspective to “turn the analytic lens,” psychologists can 
illuminate previously “invisible” psychological constructions among dominant 
members. Previous research has focused on exploring why Black Americans believe 
conspiracy theories or perceive racism in ambiguous events. However, in the present 
study engagement with White identity was related to perceptions of racism, too, if not 
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more strongly related than Black identity. In the least, this suggests that denials of 
racism are not an anchor by which one should judge objective neutrality. Perceptions 
(and denials) of racism are identity relevant for White Americans, too. 
Also, psychologists typically study psychological phenomena as individual-
level, culture-neutral processes. A cultural psychology approach suggests one can 
examine how mind is also represented externally and “inscribed" in everyday cultural 
worlds (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertch, 2002). While the present study does not directly 
focus on external representations of mind, by exploring representations of Black 
history, the study supports this approach. Perceptions of racism are linked to many 
individual-level variables, but they are also linked to collective representations of the 
past.  
Finally, this project presents an important direction for research on prejudice, 
discrimination, and racism. The present research suggests that there are liberating 
representations of American history that allow all Americans, regardless of their 
identity, to reconcile their collective past in hope of building a better collective future. 
This is important because the extent to which one believes racism should be 
eradicated from American society today probably reflects the extent to which one 
believes racism is still present.  
One way people come to define and recognize racism is through engagement 
with varying cultural environments. However, many Americans are living in 
segregated communities and mainstream representations of history and racism are 
likely to be the primary source of information regarding views on racism. To the 
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extent that history textbooks, museums, and mainstream American narratives of the 
past shape our present views on the topic, this work suggests America might have 
more writing and editing to do. Ignoring the perspectives and narratives of the 
oppressed may do more harm than good. This research suggests an alternative 
sociocultural strategy for improving intergroup relations in America: exposure to 
liberating representations of history. 
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1. Please complete the sentence: In terms of racial/ethnic group, I prefer to 
identify with the label ____________________. 
Collective Self Esteem adapted for race/ethnicity 
1. I often regret that I belong to my racial/ethnic group. reverse scored (private 
regard) 
2. Overall, my race/ethnicity has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
Reverse scored  (identity centrality)  
3. In general, I’m glad to be a member of my racial/ethnic group. (private 
regard) 
4. The racial/ethnic group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am. 
(identity centrality) 
5. Overall, I often feel that my racial/ethnic group is not worthwhile. Reverse 
scored (private regard) 
6. My race/ethnicity is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
Reverse scored (identity centrality) 
7. I feel good about the race/ethnicity I belong to. (private regard) 
8. In general, belonging to my race/ethnicity is an important part of my self-
image. (identity centrality) 
Collective Self Esteem adapted for nationality 
1. I often regret that I belong to my nation. reverse scored (private regard) 
2. Overall, my national identity has very little to do with how I feel about 
myself. reverse scored  (identity centrality) 
3. In general, I’m glad to be a citizen of my nation. (private regard) 
4. The nation I belong to is an important reflection of who I am. (identity 
centrality) 
5. Overall, I often feel that my nation is not worthwhile. reverse scored (private 
regard) 
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6. My national identity is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
reverse scored (identity centrality) 
7. I feel good about the nation I belong to. (private regard) 
8. In general, belonging to my nation is an important part of my self-image. 
(identity centrality) 
Claims of Racism Denial 
1. Claims of racism in events surrounding Hurricane Katrina were wildly 
exaggerated. 
2. Hurricane Katrina laid bare the reality of racism in America. reverse 
3. During the aftermath of Katrina, it was common to see Whites helping Blacks. 
4. The number of White people who donated resources to Katrina victims shows 
that claims of racism in Katrina were exaggerated. 
5. It is hard to believe accusations of racism in post-Katrina New Orleans when 
the mayor of the city is Black. 
Perceptions of Racism in Hurricane Katrina  
1. The U.S. Government’s slow response in aiding New Orleans residents during 
the Katrina disaster. (systemic) 
2. A White man in a pick-up truck fleeing New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
decides not to pick up some Black people walking alongside the highway. 
(individualistic) 
3. Levee breaks that left the poorest areas of New Orleans devastated beyond 
repair while the affluent areas (i.e., French Quarter and Uptown) suffered 
minor damage. (systemic) 
4. Separation of families (including those with young children) during 
evacuation and rescue efforts. (systemic) 
5. A White New Orleans police officer stops a car full of Black people fleeing 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and asks to see their vehicle registration. 
(individualistic) 
6. Media use of the term “refugees” to describe hurricane evacuees. (systemic) 
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7. Gretna police refuse to let New Orleanians cross a bridge to the West Bank in 
order to escape the city. (systemic) 
8. Attempts to bulldoze homes in the lower ninth ward. (systemic) 
9. A White New Orleans police officer arrests a Black man for stealing a TV the 
day after Hurricane Katrina strikes. (systemic) 
10. St. Charles parish’s decision to ban new trailer parks to house Katrina 
refugees. (systemic) 
11. Media descriptions of White Americans as “finding” food while Black 
Americans were labeled “looting”. (systemic) 
12. Proposals to turn some flooded neighborhoods back into wetlands. 
(individualistic) 
13. Attempts to reduce the physical size of the city. (systemic)  
14. Leaving New Orleans residents trapped for days inside the Superdome. 
(systemic) 
15. A White rescue worker searching the city in the aftermath of Katrina passes 
by a group of stranded Black people in his boat without stopping to help. 
(individualistic) 
16. Barbara Bush’s statement that poor people at a relocation center in Houston 
were faring better than before Katrina struck. (individualistic) 
17. Claims that violence in New Orleans was so prevalent that rescue attempts 
had to be postponed, leaving thousands of residents stranded. (systemic) 
Systemic-Individual Conception Continuum 
1. Some people think that racism stems primarily from racist individuals who 
discriminate against ethnic minorities and treat them badly. Other people think 
racism stems primarily from social or cultural structures that keep ethnic minorities 
poor and fail to provide them with adequate education. Where do YOU think racism 





          Biased                                               Social-Cultural 
       Individuals                               Structures 
 
Open-Ended History Measure 
1. Imagine that you are responsible for organizing an educational bulletin board 
to commemorate Black History month. In the space below, please list up to 5 
Black History events that you think would be the most important to portray. 
True/False Historical Knowledge Test 
1. An African American doctor invented the process of extracting plasma from 
whole blood for the purpose of storage and transfusion. T 
2. Booker T. Washington helped to initiate the civil rights movement in 1955. F 
3. Fourteen year old African American Emmett Till was kidnapped, brutally 
beaten, shot, and dumped for allegedly whistling at a white woman. The two 
white men acquitted for his murder by an all-white jury later boasted about 
committing the murder in a Look magazine interview. T 
4. Among many pursuits, African American Benjamin Banneker contributed to 
the historic survey that laid out the District of Columbia. T 
5. In Tuskegee, Alabama the U.S. Government deceived over 600 African 
American men by hiding their diagnosis of syphilis, and for the next forty 
years denied them medical treatment for this potentially fatal disease. T 
6. George Washington Carver invented hundreds of uses for the peanut and other 
plants. T 
7. Medgar Evers struggled for the civil rights of Black Americans and was 
assassinated for his writings. T 
8. In the 1980’s Congress passed the Preservation Act which made it difficult for 
African immigrants to enter the U.S. F 
9. The Emancipation Proclamation abolished slavery completely throughout the 
entire United States. F 
 71 
10. African American Paul Ferguson was shot outside of his Alabama home for 
trying to integrate professional football. F 
11. Ralph Bunche was the first African American to receive Nobel Prize for 
Peace. T 
12. An African American operated in the first successful open heart surgery. T 
13. After slavery ended, Jim Crow laws—which enforced segregation, limited 
black job opportunities and kept Black Americans from voting—remained in 
effect during the 1960s. T 
14. The U.S. Government promised payment of 40 acres of land and a mule for 
their “services” as slaves but never delivered such payment. T 
15. Garrett Morgan invented and patented the rotary blade lawnmower. F 
16. The Supreme Court decision Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) declared that separate 
facilities for whites and blacks were constitutional, thus facilitating 
segregation. T 
17. Fredrick Douglas, born a slave, escaped and became America's most 
prominent abolitionist and anti-slavery agitator during the 19th century. T 
18. Bernice Bethune was a leader in the black women's club movement and 
served as president of the National Association of Colored Women. F 
19. The F.B.I. has employed illegal techniques (e.g., hidden microphones in 
motels) in an attempt to discredit African American political leaders during 
the civil rights movement. T 
20. The African American slave Dred Scott sued for his freedom. The Supreme 
Court ruled that he was property, not a citizen of the United States and 
therefore could not sue in federal court. T 
21. Less than 200 Black people were lynched in the U.S. during the one hundred 
year span between 1870 and 1970. F 
22. Shirley Chisholm was the first African American woman elected to Congress. 
T 
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23. The U.S. government deliberately created and administered the HIV virus to 
over 900 African Americans in a secret project during the 1980s. F 
24. Mae Jemison was the first Black Female astronaut. T 
25. In 1927, rich White New Orleans residents intentionally blew the levees to 
protect their property and flood other areas. Consequently, Black Americans 
lived in refugee camps and were forced at gunpoint to repair the broken 
levees. T 
Demographic Questions 
1. What is your age?  
2. What is your gender? 
3. What is your socioeconomic status? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
